Full transcript follows..
» Arun Sukumar: I’m a journalist with the Indian express. My question, if I may, is specifically to the representatives from Brazil and India. What do you see ‑‑ where do you see the role of governments vis-a-vis other stakeholders in outcome‑oriented Internet Governance process? Do you see them on an equal footing or as primary interlocutors?
» Benedicto Fonseca Filho: Thank you. I would like to thank the question and it also gives me the opportunity also to reflect on the point that was previously made on the issue of equal footing, how the multi‑stakeholder approach.
First of all, I would like to remind that for government, the basic framework under which we work and we try to be consistent with in everything, at least this is an attempt to try to do in Brazil, is to be consistent with the framework that was established by the Tunis Agenda, which is our basic parameter. So Tunis Agenda recognizes there are different roles, responsibilities for stakeholders that all of those stakeholders have legitimate concerns and interests.
So that’s does not mean equal role. Equal role in the context of Tunis Agenda applies specifically to the notion of even enhanced cooperation, in the context referring to public policies, governments should have equal role in designing those.
Of course there is an effort in the maximum extent possible. And this was confirmed by the NETmundial conference to extend the multi‑stakeholder approach whenever possible. And thank very much for Kathy Brown for having given us ‑‑ I think she was very precise in that description, I think much better than most of us could have done explaining how we try to work in Brazil. Having the multi‑stakeholder discussion implementing various layers and levels. So it’s ‑‑ equal footing is not always there. Just to give an example, in regard to critical resources, there’s not equal footing. Governments are not implementing equal footing. Governments have an advisory role. And I think nobody’s trying to say equal footing should apply there. But in some other governmental where there is not equal footing on multi‑stakeholder participation, there is we are one hundred percent in favor of opening up intergovernmental discussions to multi‑stakeholder participation. Discussions should be better informed boy multi‑stakeholder approach. Organising in some cases the decision will be intergovernmental. And I think this is a fact that should be recognized.
I think the whole ecosystem request work in harmony if there is mutual recognition, mutual acceptance, mutual respect. I think we tried to do it in the context of NETmundial. I’d just like to quote something that I think reflects very much that notion in regard to cybersecurity and cybercrime. It says, “It is necessary to strengthen international cooperation on topics such as jurisdiction and law enforcement, assistance to promote cybersecurity, and prevent cybercrime. Discussions about those frameworks should be held in a multi‑stakeholder manner.”
So I think we tried here to reconcile the idea of multi‑stakeholder discussion in processes that are intergovernmental, cybercrime, cybersecurity. All cybersecurity has dimension that extends beyond the government, but those, of course, cybercrime is a very precise area.
So I think there is a need to maybe have an understanding and, again, I think mutual recognition, mutual respect. I think this is the basis for the decision to work in a better way, making the best of the contribution of each stakeholder to the benefit of all.
» Nermine el‑Saadany: Thank you, ambassador. Your excellency, please?
»R.S. Sharma: Thank you very much. Firstly, I’ll take that question from India which says that we should hold the regional or national IGFs. In India, just to inform you, we are having one in the end of November. And we certainly believe that we’ll continue to have such consultations and discussions with all these stakeholders in our country, which actually impinge on the Internet Governance.
On the issue of our friend from the Indian Express who asked the question whether everybody should be on the equal footing or not, I think I would like to agree with my friend from Brazil. Essentially everyone has a role to play in this game, and this is not a game which is played at one level. This is a multilevel situation. Let me explain that. You know, you have an infrastructure on which the entire traffic moves. Entire structure nonappearance India which is essentially the government of the country, along with the private sector participants create. And it is all private sector and certainly involve many, many standards and many, many other parties. Then comes the critical resources. Now, obviously the government says do not have a very direct role to play. It is something role‑based situation, which is happening. And therefore, it should continue to happen that way.
Then comes the issue of, you know, security, cybersecurity. Now, certainly governments are not the only arbiter of what is the cybersecurity part. But certainly governments have a responsibility. And they will, obviously, have to get feedback from the industry, from the experts in that area. That is when they’ll be able to make policy decisions or some kind of actions.
So essentially cybersecurity is an area where every stakeholders will certainly need to be consulted with their expertise utilized. But ultimately it is the governments who will have to take action in that particular space. Obviously in consultation and in collaboration with the private sector.
Lastly, the applications which are riding on the net, and obviously government do not have much role to play in so far as they do not look at cybersecurity issues, and the private sector will continue to have their role and the Civil Society and the other stakeholders.
So essentially I think labeling it as multi‑stakeholder is not really the right way to go about it, but really understanding that each component, what does each component of the whole system requires? And which are the best parties to deal with that problem? Essentially, that should be the approach. And if that approach is recognized and accepted, I think we’ll certainly have a very harmonious way of doing things and we should also then be able to have not only a discussion forum that does not lead us anywhere, but a system which can really contribute toward the decision‑making and finally lead to some conclusions. That’s our approach. And that’s, I think, what should be pursued.
Even as telecom companies lobby actively for Trai’s intervention to stem a sharp fall in mobile revenues due to the increasing popularity of Internet-based voice and texting apps, its chairperson Rahul Khullar told The Indian Express that he is “not keen” on proposing regulations.
However, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) has conceded to a “consultation paper” on regulating apps. “The consultation paper will test the ground to see how grave the problem is,” Khullar said, adding that it will only be released after preliminary discussions with all stakeholders. He also acknowledged that telcos have a “valid” concern regarding loss of revenue.
In a confidential white paper prepared earlier this year, the telecom industry had warned that a “perfect storm” of declining mobile revenues and increasing operator costs was imminent, as more users turned to products like Skype, Facebook messenger and Whatsapp. The Indian Express has access to the white paper prepared by the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI), the industry representative.
A COAI representative said the white paper was solely for “internal circulation”, and was not submitted either to the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) or Trai.
It estimates that “Indian telecom operators may lose $3.1 billion in SMS revenues by 2016 due to the emergence of social messaging apps”. The paper suggests operators can respond in four ways — blocking these apps if regulators let them, adjusting their pricing to make apps less attractive, either by charging more for rival services that run on their networks or by making their own cheaper, or partnering with third-party apps.
The Trai Act allows the regulator to recommend measures to facilitate growth and competition in the telecom sector. But it can also lay down standards relating to the quality of service to be provided by telcos. The COAI white paper suggests this is a major issue regarding apps, “as the network is choked with high bandwidth services” and operators are “struggling to add capacity”.
Trai has not taken a stance on the principle of ‘network neutrality’, and it is not clear how the regulator will respond to instances where an Internet service provider has sped up or slowed down service from a particular app.
Recommendations issued by Trai in 2012 on “application services” suggested the issue of Net neutrality will be dealt with as and when required. That paper nevertheless acknowledged that telcos may give “low priority” to applications as regards those with whom they have revenue-sharing agreements.
Khullar declined to comment on the matter, saying it is “not appropriate to anticipate a decision”.
Besides loss in revenue, another major concern expressed by telecom companies is network security. A DoT circular issued in 2011 requires that content providers “allow the inspection of their hardware, software, design, development and manufacturing facility” by telcos, DoT or “designated agencies”. Asked how this would be possible between an Indian telecom company and a foreign app creator with minimal presence in the country, a Trai official referred to the instance where Blackberry was forced to locate some of its servers to India based on government regulations.
“Blocking is always an option,” he said, laughing, and added that he was sure that the Indian market for apps would be “big enough” for them to set shop here.
1. City Room - Arthur Gelb (Putnam Adult, 2003)
2. Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy - Rahul Sagar (Princeton UP, 2014)
3. The Global War for Internet Governance - Laura DeNardis (Yale UP, 2014)
4. Battles of the New Republic: A Contemporary History of Nepal - Prashant Jha (Aleph/Hurst, 2014)
5. No place to hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the US Surveillance State - Glenn Greenwald (Metropolitan, 2014)
6. Gas Wars: Crony Capitalism and the Ambanis - Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, with Subir Ghosh and Jyotirmay Chaudhary (Feel Books, 2014)
7. The Indian Media Business - Vandita Khandekar-Kohli (Sage, 2013)
8. The Informal Constitution - Abhinav Chandrachud (OUP, 2014)
9. The Fiction of Fact-Finding: Modi and Godhra - Manoj Mitta (Harper India, 2014)
10. The Future of International Law - Joel Trachtman (Cambridge UP, 2013)
Any attempt at crystal gazing the process by which the Modi government will articulate its foreign policy must defer to three developments: the appointment of Sushma Swaraj as foreign minister, Ajit K. Doval as National Security Advisor, and the unambiguous signals rising from the PM’s office that it will be the final arbiter of India’s foreign policy. What will be the role of the MEA, and how will the Ministry lend itself to the conduct of foreign policy in the backdrop of a powerful PMO?
The MEA v. PMO narrative — that hot button issues have been taken away from the Ministry in recent years, relegating it to less important functions – is misplaced. As one official who worked closely with Dr. Manmohan Singh told me recently, it is unrealistic to expect the Prime Minister in any modern government to delegate decision-making in foreign policy. Indeed, Modi’s first few days in government have been heavily weighted towards FP, what with his reaching out to SAARC leaders. Given the enormous interest and curiosity globally to engage with Modi, it is only fair and legitimate that the PMO has the last word on international relations. Where does that leave the MEA?
The appointment of a senior minister – third ranking in the Cabinet – is a welcome sign. For starters, Swaraj’s appointment will foster a robust dialogue on foreign policy in Cabinet meetings, not least because she is an outspoken politician. In fact, having two heavyweights occupy the post of MEA and PMO facilitates the evolution of an organic decision-making process. There are two separate tracks here: political and bureaucratic. The political dialogue on foreign policy will by no means be confined to Modi and Swaraj, but as I’ve written, may enjoy a pride of place in Cabinet meetings.
The primary interlocutors in bureaucratic engagement will likely be the Foreign Secretary and the National Security Advisor. Ajit Doval’s appointment is significant not just because he is an internal security expert (the PMO is on the hunt for a Dy. NSA who fits the diplomatic/ external affairs profile - Amb. Jaishankar has reportedly declined the offer). In this regard at least, there will be no difference from the Shiv Shankar Menon/Nehchal Sandhu jugalbandi (Menon cut his teeth as a diplomat, while Sandhu was an IB guy). But unlike his predecessors Brajesh Mishra, M.K. Narayanan, J.N. Dixit, and Shiv Shankar Menon, Doval does not enjoy the personal confidence of his political masters yet. In this respect, Doval’s an out and out “professional” appointment, the first to that office.
As a result, I do not see cliques forming in the PMO, which may be inclined to “hijack” the foreign policy discourse entirely. Hawk/dove differences may still persist, but that is only natural within government. If anything, appointing two bureaucrats unfamiliar with Modi’s ways to the NSA provides ample opportunity for the MEA to be the go-to ministry on key foreign policy issues. I’ll stick my neck out and predict continuity in areas like climate change negotiations, international trade and internet governance, and the MEA continues to be the nodal ministry on these matters. Structurally, the decision-making process may move towards the PMO (a key departure from the MMS era) but the NSA’s office is likely to be a co-ordinator and liaison with the Ministries of External Affairs, Defence and Finance, rather than a super-diplomat.
(Cartoon from The Atlantic. I own no rights)
Why the PM-in-waiting must engage Iran
Perceptibly absent from the list of congratulatory exchanges India’s PM-in-waiting Narendra Modi has had with world leaders, are those from the Gulf states (at the time of writing)*. These are early days, but it is not too difficult to imagine why: West Asian governments will likely monitor PM Modi’s initial utterances before engaging him as a head of state. It is now clear from electoral data that the Muslim vote share for the Congress this time has dramatically increased, busting the notion that the BJP won on an inclusive platform. The number of Muslim MPs in the 16th Lok Sabha will be a measly 22, and all 7 of BJP’s 482 candidates failed at the ballot. The message from these numbers will not be lost on the embassies of the Gulf states in Delhi, who will duly communicate the goings-on to their political leadership.
(Note: West Asia, for the most part, has pursued pragmatic relations with New Delhi — independent of Muslim attitudes in India — but since Modi is an unknown variable, you can be sure they’ll have their ears to the ground.)
That, however, should not dissuade Modi himself from reaching out to the Arab states, and Iran in particular, even before he formally takes charge as PM. In fact, cutting so through diplomatic protocol will reassure West Asia of the NDA government’s commitment to continuity in India’s defining foreign policy principles. Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu has already seized the initiative, losing not a moment in congratulating Modi after the votes were counted. Even as the European Union and US line up with invites for him, Modi’s first act of statesmanship can be extending his hand to West Asia, where India’s relations continue to be rock solid.
Of special significance would be Modi’s engagement with Iran, which is going through a critical phase of resurgence in the comity of nations. For starters, Modi would do well to assuage Tehran’s concerns that his government may take sides in the Iran-Israel detente (in which India is a bit player with nothing to gain from choosing camps). Second, he should re-affirm the Indian position on Iran’s nuclear programme, which is that the Islamic Republic is fully entitled to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Above all, the Modi government must back the ongoing Geneva process to the hilt, in line with India’s welcoming the interim agreement of November and generally of resolving the nuclear crisis through dialogue.
(Note: the BJP has a legacy of reaching out to Iran, with former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s highly symbolic and successful visit to Iran in 2001, which was reciprocated by President Mohammed Khatami a couple years later. In fact, the Tehran and Delhi declarations can be treated as the founding basis of strategic Indo-Iran ties.)
Instrumentalist as our relationship with Iran has become – I have written about this here – Modi’s platform of development fits nicely with warmer Indo-Iran ties. I’m personally not too optimistic about an Iran-P5+1 agreement this July, but it is certain the interim agreement will be extended for a finite period. Iran’s economy will, in the process, open up, and Rouhani and co will leave no stone unturned to do business with emerging markets. With the US drawdown in Afghanistan imminent, the importance of the Persian Gulf to Indian interests cannot be exaggerated. A cap on crude sales may not be lifted soon, but it would be eminently advisable for the NDA to do what it can to reduce the political risk associated in commercial transactions with the region, oil and otherwise. Modi’s embrace of Iran is a good first step.
(Clarification: After publishing this post, I received word that the leadership of Qatar did indeed contact Modi after the elections)
India will not support ongoing US efforts at the United Nations to impose sanctions against South Sudan, The Sunday Express has learnt.
On Tuesday, the Obama administration announced — for the first time since conflict broke out in the world’s newest republic last year — economic sanctions against key parties on both sides of the conflict. Subsequently, US representative to the UN Samantha Powers suggested the US will seek “targeted sanctions on those who undermine South Sudan’s stability”.
The Ministry of External Affairs and the Indian Mission to the UN are yet to comment formally on Powers’s statement, but sources suggest India will be reluctant to join US efforts to introduce such punitive measures, “irrespective of their purpose”. South Sudan is experiencing a civil war drawn along ethnic lines after Vice-President Riek Machar’s purported attempt to seize power from President Salva Kiir in December 2013.
India has significant commercial stakes in the region, with oil from Sudan and South Sudan contributing about eight per cent of ONGC Videsh Ltd’s overall production in the previous financial year. ONGC has invested $2.5 billion in South Sudan’s oil economy, but was forced to shelve operations after the onset of civil war. India is concerned its “legitimate trade interests” will be affected by the sanctions, sources told The Sunday Express. India has retained essential embassy personnel in Juba, South Sudan’s capital.
US-led efforts to impose sanctions on South Sudan have gained momentum at the UN. The UN Mission in South Sudan submitted a report last week to the UN Secretary General on rights violations, concluding that “crimes against humanity” had been committed. It recommended a “special tribunal” to probe the crimes.
With a view to assert the “sovereign right” of governments to “regulate and manage” the internet, India will oppose the proposal to “reform” the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) — the principal body that manages the web’s domain name system — at the ongoing Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance (NETmundial) in Brazil.
In fact, the Indian position is so divergent from the NETmundial’s stated goals that Delhi has sought to relegate its “outcome document” to the status of a “discussion paper”. India’s response to the draft outcome document categorically rejects the ICANN’s proposal to “transition” from a US-controlled model to a “multi-stakeholder” approach to internet governance.
The Indian Express accessed New Delhi’s response to the draft “outcome document” that was deliberated by the NETMundial High Level Committee. Here's what it said.